Introduction

Gillick v West Norfolk Area Health Authority
i was a landmark decision, ii crystallising a new legal approach recognising minors as independent rights holders. The House of Lords held that competent minors under the age of 16 (referred to in this article as 'minors') could seek contraceptive advice and treatment in their own right. Lord Scarman held that a competent minor will have 'sufficient understanding and intelligence to enable him or her to understand fully what is proposed'.
iii Gillick promised to make competent minors 'small scale sovereigns'. iv It ostensibly gave them authority to make certain decisions. However the scope of the authority lacked clarity, enabling its limitation in subsequent cases.
As we shall see, problems with Gillick stem from both inherent limitations (it was designed to respond to a specific issue but has been applied in much wider contexts) and its subsequent judicial interpretation, particularly in a series of cases restricting the powers of competent minors to refuse life-sustaining treatment (collectively referred to in this article as the 'refusals cases'). These problems have existed for some time, but are increasingly pertinent as children's autonomy rights gain mounting recognition at both judicial and political levels. This article brings to the debate new emphasis on the problematic application of the test in clinical practice, which has been the focus of a recent research project v and a novel proposal for reform.
The paper begins by setting out the ambiguities inherent in the current interpretation of Gillick. It is argued that the test is an inadequate tool for adjudicating the balancing exercise which clinicians and judges are sometimes called upon to perform between protecting minors' welfare by preserving life and health vi and taking into consideration minors' views and giving them due weight. vii Turning to potential solutions, emphasis is placed on a recent Court of Appeal decision in which it was recognised that adults who have capacity under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) may nevertheless lack capacity at common law. viii McFarlane LJ was careful to formulate the common law test in line with the facilitative approach of the MCA. An extension of the same principle to minors might enable the law to adopt a universal approach to capacity whilst simultaneously ensuring that the welfare of minors is protected. If so, it may (at least in the field of competence to make medical treatment decisions) be time to say 'Goodbye' to Gillick.
Capacity and competence
At the outset, it is useful to put the Gillick competence test (which applies to under 16 year olds) in context. The law in England and Wales relating to two other age groups is worthy of comparison. MCA defines a person lacking capacity as someone, who is, on the balance of probabilities, … unable to make a decision for himself in relation to the matter because of an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain … on the basis that he cannot understand, retain, use or communicate his decision (section 3).
Much of the MCA also applies to 16 and 17 year olds. In addition, the ability of 16/17 year olds to consent to medical treatment is governed by section 8 of the Family Law Reform Act 1969. Consequently, 16/17 year olds are presumed both to be competent and to have capacity, but both presumptions are rebuttable. Where 16/17 year olds lack competence their guardian or the court will make decisions which prioritise the minors' welfare. xii Where 16/17 year olds lack capacity, the MCA sets down a framework designed to ensure that decisions are taken on their behalf, in their best interests. xiii There is overlap between the schemes but there are also points of departure. For example, a 16 year old who cannot make a decision because he lacks maturity is likely to have MCA capacity but lack competence under the Family Law Reform Act.
Gillick and treatment refusals
The Gillick competence test responded to the public policy requirement that some minors under the age of 16 should be able to access contraceptive treatment without necessarily having to involve their parents. , where incompetence (rather than a judicial veto of competent decisions) was cited to justify the overriding of each minor's refusal. However, the ambiguous definition of competence enabled judges to raise the threshold to arguably unattainable levels.
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In both types of case, there is a lack of clarity as to the appropriate timing of the assessment of competence and the method of assessment. In addition, the value of competence -the authority it confers on the minor -is contentious because it was not made clear why minority status renders a competent decision subject to veto. It is to these three ambiguities that we now turn.
The trouble with Gillick
Timing of the assessment Section 3 of the MCA requires, that capacity is, in part, a question of actually understanding the information relevant to the decision. On the basis of the dicta of Lord Scarman and Lord Fraser and the interpretation of Gillick in the refusals cases, there is doubt as to whether this is required of the Gillick competent minor.
According to the House of Lords, a competent minor is one who has the capability to understand. 'Capability' refers to the minor having the ability to understand which, in turn, will depend on the complexities of the particular decision. As Mostyn J There are sound reasons for capability forming part of the competence test. First it reflects the legal presumption that minors under the age of 16 lack competence. It is the duty of clinicians to establish how much information to give them and in what form, by assessing their capability. If, instead, the test required an assessment of minors' actual understanding of the information, then the law would require full disclosure to all children, which has the potential to cause harm. Second, the emphasis on capability protects the physician who assesses the minor to be Gillick competent, provides the information and the treatment and finds subsequently that the minor did not fully understand it, from a claim in battery. By way of comparison, under the MCA, capability to understand is relevant to the assessment of capacity. A person ('with an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain') will lack capacity if they have an inability to understand the relevant information. xxx The inability might be proved by incapability to understand or by a failure to actually understand. Reliance on the former is limited by a requirement to take all reasonable steps to help the person decide.
xxxi If Gillick competence has been interpreted to relate purely to capability to decide (which, as shall be shown in the next section, is one potential interpretation of the subsequent case law), then this creates a tension between the application of the test in court and in practice. In the latter, as we shall see, the dynamic process of consent requires a consideration of both capability to understand and actual understanding.
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Treatment / refusal distinction
It may be that reliance on competence as capability is in part responsible for the distinction which has emerged post-Gillick between consent and refusal. Two interpretations of the competence test are possible. On the first interpretation, competence is assessed as capability, so a minor capable of consenting but unable to understand or communicate a decision to refuse treatment might nevertheless be labelled 'competent', requiring the court to overrule the 'competent' decision in order to protect the minor's welfare. On the second interpretation, competence is assessed as both capability and actual understanding in which case the assessment might incorporate the minor's ability to choose between having and not having the treatment. On this interpretation, the court retains the power to consent if the minor refuses and treatment is in his best interests. Either interpretation is possible on the basis of Re W xxxii which concerned the refusal of treatment by a 16 year old (who, it will be recalled, is presumed competent to consent to treatment under section 8(1) of the Family Law Reform Act 1969). Lord Donaldson did not decide one way or another:
No question of "Gillick competence" in common law terms arises. The 16-or 17-year-old is conclusively presumed to be "Gillick competent" or, alternatively, the test of "Gillick competence" is bypassed and has no relevance.
xxxiii Section 8(3) of the Family Law Reform Act, xxxiv which preserves existing law, was held to have the effect that parents and the court retain the ability to consent alongside minors. Lord Balcombe stated:
The purpose of [section 8] is clear: it is to enable a 16-year-old to consent to medical treatment which, in the absence of consent by the child or its parents, would constitute a trespass to the person. In other words, for this purpose, and for this purpose only, a minor was to be treated as if it were an adult.
xxxv Some have interpreted this to mean that section 8(1) applies only to consent and not to refusal xxxvi in which case the presumption of competence only applies to decisions to consent. Provided the presumption of competence is not rebutted, 16/17 year olds can consent but do not necessarily have the power to refuse treatment. If this is so, the competence relating to consent and competence relating to refusal must be assessed separately because a presumption of competence applies to one and not the other.
On the second interpretation, it could be inferred from Re W that competence applies to the decision rather than separately to consent and refusal. an abscess is asked to choose between antibiotics and minor surgery, the clinician will want to ensure that the minor understands the alternatives in relation to each other. Similarly, when a minor chooses between radiotherapy and palliative care, the clinician is interested in the minor's ability to decide between the two rather than to understand each in isolation. On this interpretation, both capability and actual understanding are relevant. The presumption of competence applies to the decision and thus to both consent and refusal.
Ambiguity surrounding this issue leads to a potential distinction between treatment and refusal and potentially to assessment taking place before a decision is reached so that competence to assent requires the court to overrule refusals rather than assess the minor's competence to decide between having and not having the treatment.
Defining Competence
In terms of defining competence, it is apparent from the previous section that there is dissention regarding what must be understood in order for a minor to be viewed competent. In addition, there is uncertainty surrounding the required level of understanding. Lord Scarman requires the minor to 'understand fully what is proposed'. xxxix Lord Fraser sets out what this entails in the context of contraceptive advice, xl but in other contexts the required level of understanding will necessarily differ. Similarly, 'maturity' has proved difficult to define. It might incorporate physical, psychological, emotional, cognitive, and / or social maturity. Undeniably childhood has a biological component but how this is construed is based on the social construction of childhood. xli Whilst it is necessary that the test is flexible enough to adapt to a wider variety of contexts, too much flexibility enables those assessing competence to focus less on the minor's functional ability to make the decision and more on the outcome of the decision. In some cases, because the outcome of the minor's decision would be so serious, it is difficult to see how the minor could prove competence. 
The authority conferred by virtue of competence
A third ambiguity concerns the relationship between competence and authority. For adults, the law on consent is gradually metamorphosing from a legal tool designed to transfer responsibility (and so defend doctors from a claim in battery) to a means of protecting patient autonomy. xliii The concept of Gillick competence and its subsequent judicial interpretation acts as a barrier to the same process occurring in relation to child consent. Being competent only enables minors to authorise decisions which relevant others determine to be in their best interests. This position has potential to conflict with minors' rights.
Minors' moral rights are notoriously difficult to define. Baroness O'Neill has expressed doubt that 'rights' are necessarily the best way to protect children, preferring instead to articulate the relevant obligations of adults. This does not deny the necessity to satisfy Articles 3 of the UNCRC which makes the best interests of the minor a primary consideration. The application of the welfare principle does not of itself require that the court has the power to veto competent decisions. Provided the test for competence is clear and will correctly identify those who lack functional capacity in relation to the particular decision, it should be possible to protect welfare (at least on a rights-based account) by virtue of a facilitative rather than an authoritarian approach. If this is so then, as we shall see, intervention under the parens patriae aspect of the inherent jurisdiction could be limited to decisions on behalf of those who are shown to lack capacity. 
Competence in practice
Prior to exploring potential solutions, this section considers ways in which the legal ambiguities impact upon clinical practice. As part of the Medical Practitioners, Adolescents and Informed Consent project, we have held a series of multidisciplinary workshops focusing on the impact of the law on adolescent consent in practice. We have debated the current ambiguities in adolescent consent and alternatives for reform. The common law develops in response to cases which come before the court rather than by reference to clinicians' need for a comprehensive framework. Furthermore, the test has evolved with application by judges rather than doctors in mind. There are subtle differences in the way the test operates in the different arenas. For example, the court assesses competence in relation to a specific issue at a given time. Clinicians operate in a more volatile environment, where a minor's competence can change over time and in relation to different decisions. Underlying the differences in approach are the diverse functions of informed consent. The court traditionally focused on legal consent, which is designed to transfer responsibility.
lxxviii Clinical consent, on the other hand, aims to facilitate treatment by fostering cooperation, enabling decision-making, preventing harm and doing good.
As was highlighted in the previous section, it is apparent that, when the concept of Gillick competence is applied by clinicians, the ambiguities surrounding the assessment of competence, its timing and value can be accentuated. As we have seen, in addition to making things difficult for clinicians, the uncertainties have potential to pose significant barriers to the protection of children's rights.
Three additional effects of legal ambiguity on clinical practice are worthy of further explanation. Firstly, and most obviously the ambiguities highlighted in the previous section create uncertainty amongst doctors, minors and their families about the relevance of competence and when and how it should be assessed. The GMC, lxxix Department of Health lxxx and British Medical Association lxxxi provide invaluable advice but are stymied by ambiguous and contradictory law. Gillick has been applied in New Zealand and Australia. There, the practical problems have been articulated more fully than is the case here. This is in part a result of the academic furore over the refusals cases in England and Wales. By comparison, Gillick has been referred to as the golden age of adolescent consent. lxxxii In countries which do not have the unfavourable comparison of subsequent legal development against which to contrast the Gillick decision, there is a more candid appreciation of its inherent defects, particularly in relation to its application in clinical practice. In the words of a commentator from New Zealand:
The English House of Lords decision in Gillick has dominated the issue of minor capacity to consent for the last 25 years, but the decision has raised more issues and ambiguities than it hoped to solve. lxxxiii A New South Wales Law Reform Commission has drafted a Bill lxxxiv building on
Gillick on the basis that:
… the ambiguities in the common law are important enough to warrant closer attention and to be clarified in legislation. … these ambiguities do not generally reflect simple technical uncertainties in the operation of the law, but relate to more substantive questions about the decision-making processes for young people's health care. Attempts at clarification should not be left to the necessarily ad hoc developments of the common law but should be based on considered policies… lxxxv In Australia, some states rely on Gillick but others have legislated to resolve the confusions. A recent survey found that in Queensland (which relies on Gillick), there was considerable variation in the responses from practitioners to a questionnaire asking how they would deal with a minor who sought to make a contentious medical decision. lxxxvi In England and Wales too, there is evidence that practitioners find the law confusing and incoherent. lxxxvii The uncertainty also affects minors and their parents. lxxxviii This potentially acts as a barrier to the participation of minors in medical treatment decisions which Article 12 of the UNCRC require to be 'given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child'.
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The second practical implication of the ambiguity surrounding Gillick competence is that uncertainty regarding the definition and value of competence has implications in respect to other aspects of a minor's treatment. For example, it affects the minor's right to information (for example where a parent insists that information is withheld from a minor) and confidentiality xc (for example where a minor requests that his decision to refuse treatment is kept from his parents).
lxxxiii T Grimwood, 'Gillick and the consent of minors: contraceptive advice and treatment in New Zealand ' (2010) On the other hand, reductions in freedom and voluntariness affect the value of consent to the minor. As Baroness O'Neill recognises: 'Where free and informed consent is given, agents will have a measure of protection against coercion and deception.' xcv To discourage the use of predictions of court authorisations to persuade competent minors to accept treatment, the inherent jurisdiction would need to be limited so that competent refusals are honoured. The mode of leverage would have to be removed. In order to achieve this, a new method of protecting welfare would be needed. In the next section such a method will be proposed.
Solutions
A solution is needed which is relevant, applicable and which appropriately balances children's rights to participation and protection in both legal and clinical contexts. In this section, a number of potential solutions are rejected on the basis that they would fail to achieve these goals. An alternative solution is put forward.
The limitations of common law clarification
Ambiguities in the test for Gillick competence might be addressed through common law clarification. The Supreme Court of Canada ruled in 2009 that the application of xci Though minors' attitudes to compulsion is more dependent on their relationship with parents and clinicians than the degree of compulsion. See JOA Tan, A Stewart, R Fitzpatrick, and T Hope 'Attitudes of patients with anorexia nervosa to compulsory treatment and coercion ' (2010) For the COP to come to this conclusion, the adult in this scenario would need to be shown to be unable to make a decision for himself due to a lack of capacity. The Act makes clear that: 'A person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision merely because he makes an unwise decision' (Section 1(4)). Consequently it is far from clear that the Court would routinely protect adults in this manner. The scope to override minors' decisions, however, would be much more extensive.
The rights-based evaluation, to which McFarlane refers (and which the MCA extends to adults), would be subject to considerable dilution when applied to minors. First, McFarlane does not envisage the presumption of capacity applying to minors. cx The presumption operates in relation to adults to prevent decisions being overruled on the basis of lack of understanding alone, which might be demonstrated by virtue of the fact that the decision is contrary to the person's best interests. It is this feature which effectively renders the best interests test inapplicable unless incapacity is demonstrated.
Second, in relation to adults, the high level of understanding required by section 3(1) (incorporating not only understanding but also retaining, using, weighing or communicating the decision) is balanced by virtue of the fact that it will only come into question if section 2(1) is satisfied, namely that the patient has 'an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain'. If, unlike adults, minors bear the burden of proof of capacity, then the same high threshold which serves to protect adults from being labelled as lacking capacity, makes it all the harder for minors to prove capacity. If the result of applying the MCA test to minors is that they would find it impossible to demonstrate their capacity to refuse life sustaining treatment, then McFarlane's suggested change in approach would have minimal impact on the protections of their human rights. Furthermore, the high level of understanding required in the MCA could have negative implications for minors' rights to consent. Assuming that the MCA test would not be reserved for cases where the court adjudicates refusals cxi and should also be applied in clinical practice, the implication of fewer minors being considered competent to refuse treatment, is that fewer will be able to consent.
cxii Thus, incorporating aspects of the MCA into Gillick competence would be problematic. The MCA is designed to empower and protect the autonomy rights of adults. Cherry-picking the scheme for evaluating capacity and rejecting those provisions designed to protect adults from an outcome-based capacity test is a limited victory for children's rights even if it does enable the court to rely on the combined doctrines of competence and capacity rather than best interests to justify their overruling minors' decisions.
cx Ibid, p 484. cxi Ibid, p 484. cxii See discussion in S Gilmore and J Herring, above n xvi, p 12.
